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MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING:
LOOKING PAST THE DRAMA OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND REEVALUATING THE U.S.
DELISTING TREND AMONG NON-U.S. FIRMS
Kalani A. Morse*
Done to death by slanderous tongue
Was the Hero that here lies;
Claudio
Much Ado About Nothing
Act V Scene III
William Shakespeare

I. INTRODUCTION
The one unifying thread that runs throughout the various plots
and subplots of Shakespeare’s Much Ado About Nothing is the
plethora of successive obstacles laid in the path of young lovers
seeking to find love and marital bliss. The courting characters are
forced to negotiate a series of complex political, social, and moral
dramas that threaten to keep them apart. In particular, the play
highlights the travails and challenges of Claudio and Hero, two
well-intentioned lovers whose romantic plans are repeatedly
frustrated by the constant intervention and scheming of others.
As the drama proceeds to climax, Claudio is duped into
believing that Hero was untrue to him. Claudio publicly denounces
Hero and shames her in front of the guests assembled to witness
their wedding. After Claudio discovers that he has been deceived
regarding Hero’s loyalty, calculating characters again trick him,
this time making him believe that his slandered beloved has died
from shame and heartache. In the penultimate scene of the last act
of the play, standing over what he believes to be his beloved’s
tomb, Claudio, in the quote above, expresses his frustration and

* J.D., J. Reuben Clark Law School (2005), M.P.A., Marriott School of
Management (2005), B.A., Public Relations (2001), Brigham Young University;
Editor-in-Chief (2005) Founding Publisher (2004), International Law & Management
Review. Mr. Morse is an associate in the corporate defense practice of Torkildson Katz
Fonseca Moore & Hetherington in Honolulu, Hawai`i. The Author would like to thank
his peers and mentors who have worked so hard to quickly establish the ILMR as a
quality publication with high standards of excellence. Most of all, he would like to
express deep gratitude to his wife for offering her unfailing support through the many
late nights and weekends spent establishing the ILMR.
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grief over the slanderous lies that caused his lover to faint and die.
The final scene of the play reveals that Hero in fact lives. The two
lovers reunite and are finally able to marry.
Much like the dramas that interfered with Claudio and Hero’s
pursuit of their desired union, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(SOX) has arguably overregulated cross-border investor
relationships, causing more than its fair share of interference and
drama. Just as in Claudio and Hero’s case, overreaction, limited
information, misunderstanding, and fear of the unknown have all
combined to stifle cross-border investor relationships. The SOX
drama has recently begun interfering with relationships between
non-U.S. firms and U.S. capital markets, hindering pursuit of
otherwise financially rewarding relationships. Much like Claudio
and Hero, U.S. regulators and non-U.S. firms, both well-intentioned
parties, seek to establish and perpetuate mutually beneficial
relationships. But alas, for some confusion prevails, resulting in
delisting strategies and abandonment of U.S. capital market
listings.
Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a
steady wave of financial fraud disclosures began with the infamous
Enron/Arthur Anderson Scandal. A flurry of corporate greed and
fraud scandals at other U.S. based firms quickly followed. Financial
scandals
and
bankruptcies
at
WorldCom,
Adelphia
Communications, Qwest Communications, XO Communications,
Tyco International, and ImClone seized financial markets and
investors with fear and panic.1 Investor confidence in U.S.
corporations plummeted, resulting in a mass exodus of investors
from U.S. securities markets, arguably leading to a sharp drop in
securities prices.2 Investors and the U.S. public expressed outrage
at how many corrupt executives possessed and ultimately exercised
the ability to get away with brazen and rampant fraud.3
The U.S. Congress reacted in an uncharacteristically swift
manner, pushing extensive and dramatic corporate governance
reform proposals through the legislative process. President George
W. Bush announced his signature of the new SOX act on July 30,
2002, introducing it as “the most far-reaching reform of American

1

Tosha Huffman, Note, Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Where the Knee
Jerk Bruises Shareholders and Lifts the External Auditor, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 239, 246
(2005) (cost-benefit analysis of SOX compliance).
2
Id.
3
Id.
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business practices since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”4
Since then, firms and corporations subject to SOX compliance have
complained heavily and heartily that the dramatic corporate
governance overhaul amounted to a hastily drafted overreach of
U.S. federal regulation into financial markets.5
The drama resulting from the forbidding and dreaded
requirements of SOX compliance measures caused many firms to
reconsider their participation in U.S. capital markets. Financial
media outlets and the investing public have made “much ado” about
the small handful of non-U.S. firms who have recently elected to
pursue delisting strategies as a means of avoiding SOX-based
compliance costs. One notion gaining in popularity is that U.S.
capital markets no longer offer sufficient benefits to justify
additional SOX-based compliance costs. Many critics predict that
the trickle of non-U.S. firm delistings will quickly grow into a
flood as the purported enormity of SOX compliance burdens push
more and more firms out of U.S. markets.
In the SOX drama, just as in Shakespeare’s drama, the passage
of time, the addition of relevant information, and a renewed
perspective on issues of true importance can all help wellintentioned parties look past the misconceptions and drama that
hinder the pursuit of mutually beneficial relationships.
This article posits that the SOX drama has been somewhat
beneficial by shocking the global community into heightened levels
of accountability, fostering a strong and expanding culture of
responsible and transparent corporate governance. Furthermore,
many non-U.S. companies stand to benefit from SOX-type
compliance initiatives. Accordingly, this article argues that nonU.S. firms should not allow the SOX drama to push them into
delisting strategies that will inevitably carry high opportunity costs
and unexpectedly high delisting expenses. This article provides
both additional information and a renewed perspective on the SOX
drama that has driven the delisting trend. Part II of this paper
outlines a relevant and necessary background on basic SOX
compliance issues and the non-U.S. firm delisting trend. Part III
provides perspective by recharacterizing the “draconian” SOX
regime as a subsiding but necessary knee-jerk reaction by U.S.
lawmakers. With the primary short-term goals of restoring investor
confidence and protecting the primacy and reliability of U.S.
4
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, The Laws that Govern the
Securities Industry, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
5
Amey Stone, SOX: Not So Bad After All?, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Aug. 1, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/aug2005/nf2005081_7739_db016.htm.
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capital markets well accomplished and behind them, U.S. regulators
are more willing to let the knee-jerk reaction subside. Part III
proceeds to show that in 2005, both public firms and U.S.
regulators approached SOX compliance enforcement differently,
with cooler heads and more flexible and pragmatic approaches. Part
IV outlines important legal and compliance considerations for firms
weighing delisting strategies: opportunity costs, decreased
compliance cost mitigation, and other regulatory and pragmatic
ramifications that weigh in favor of pursuing compliance initiatives
that enable or preserve participation in U.S. capital markets. Part V
explores the globally expanding culture of proactive corporate
governance focused on increased accountability and transparency.
It also highlights cross-cultural and cross-border expectations, and
competitive and regulatory forces that will eventually disadvantage
delisted firms. Consequently, Part VI proposes that firms embrace a
proactive approach to corporate governance reform. By
strategically leveraging compliance initiatives, firms may capture
hidden value, operational efficiency, and overall market advantage
by recharacterizing and leveraging compliance programs as
proactive improvement initiatives.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Background on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
SOX set forth a host of corporate governance and financial
reporting requirements designed to revive investor confidence in
the market and prevent future financial scandals. Its effects have
been rather dramatic in some respects. While prior to SOX, many
chief executive officers (CEOs) signed off on financial statements,
section 906 of SOX boosts compliance and accountability by
imposing criminal penalties for false certification of financial
statements.6 In the wake of SOX legislation, some CEOs actually
chose to resign rather than personally endorse financial statements.7
While such outcomes obviously grab the media’s attention, SOX
6

“Knowing violations” of SOX reporting requirements are punishable by up to
$1 million in fines and ten years imprisonment. “Willful violations” are punishable by
fines up to $5 million and twenty years imprisonment. SOX does not specifically
distinguish between the two kinds of violations, and common law has yet to define the
difference between “knowing” and “willful” violations. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 § 906(c)(1)-(2), 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/gwbush/sarbanesoxley072302.pdf.
7
ROBERT PRENTICE, STUDENT GUIDE TO THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 25–26
(Thompson Publ’g 2005).
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legislation carries subtler—but arguably more important
implications—many of which carry high compliance price tags for
firms falling within their scope.
Section 404 of SOX, which took effect in July 2005, requires
managers of U.S. firms with market capitalization greater than $75
million to assess and, if necessary, upgrade the effectiveness of
internal financial controls.8 In addition to internal audit costs, firms
must also hire auditors to create and submit independent reports
regarding the adequacy of internal controls and report any
perceived material weaknesses.9
More specifically, the internal control report required by
section 404 must include a report of management’s personally
endorsed10 assessment of the effectiveness of the company’s
internal controls.11 In addition to the management's internal control

8

Floyd Norris, Regulators Seek to Trim Cost of Rules on Auditing, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 2005, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/17/business/17
audit.html?ei=5070&en=26ac29574d0c2962&ex=1116993600&pagewanted=all
(registration required).
9
Id.
10
Section 302 of SOX requires CEOs and chief financial officers (CFOs) to
certify that they have personally reviewed the quarterly and annual financial reports
filed with the SEC. Such certification amounts to management’s personal endorsement
that, based on their knowledge, the reports contain the truth and that the company’s
financial position is fairly represented. See PRENTICE, supra note 7.
11
In August of 2003, the SEC clarified the definition of internal control as
“internal control over financial reporting.” In what is clearly an effort to ensure that
generally accepted accounting principle (GAAP) standards are adhered to in the
preparation of financial reports, “internal control over financial reporting” was further
defined as:
A process designed by, or under the supervision of, the registrant's
principal executive and principal financial officers, or persons
performing similar functions, and effected by the registrant’s
board of directors, management and other personnel, to provide
reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial
reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external
purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles and includes those policies and procedures that:
(1) Pertain to the maintenance of records that in reasonable detail
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the
assets of the registrant;
(2) Provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as
necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and that
receipts and expenditures of the registrant are being made only in
accordance with authorizations of management and directors of
the registrant; and
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report, SOX requires external auditors to evaluate and submit
independent reports evaluating the quality of the company’s
internal controls and the accuracy of financial statements filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).12 Previously,
corporate management had the primary responsibility of ensuring
the accuracy of financial statements. However, “progressive”
accounting practices and “creative” reporting tactics in competitive
capital markets had long since diminished the relative value of
accuracy and honesty in financial reporting for investor relations
purposes.13 Thus, the need for increased accountability at higher
levels.
Since its inception, the costs and efforts required by SOX
stricter compliance demands have rattled public corporations and
raised a significant outcry that has not gone unnoticed by SEC
regulators.14 During the summer of 2003, the SEC released its
compliance requirements for section 404 but chose to stagger future
compliance deadlines based upon differing firms’ respective market
capitalization.15 Large firms with market capitalization greater than
$75 million received earlier compliance deadlines for their annual
reports that fiscal year while smaller companies with market
capitalization less than $75 million received later compliance
deadlines for filing their annual reports.16
Such concessions, however, failed to improve the mood among
the firms required to comply with section 404. For most public
firms, the task of documenting and testing their financial
accounting processes to ensure the accuracy of reports proved as
(3) Provide reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely
detection of unauthorized acquisition, use or disposition of the
registrant's assets that could have a material effect on the financial
statements.
Final Rule: Management’s Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting,
Exchange Act Release No. 33-8238, 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270, &
274 (June 11, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm#ia.
12
Section 302 specifically imposes responsibility for financial reporting upon
corporations. Nevertheless, in giving the SEC sole authority to promulgate the rules
related to the implementation and reporting associated with § 302, corporations lose
what autonomy they previously enjoyed. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a), 15
U.S.C. § 7241 (2005), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/gwbush/
sarbanesoxley072302.pdf.
13
PRENTICE, supra note 7, at 1–2.
14
According to some, including Congress, this rattling was long overdue and
necessary to revive investor confidence and preserve the integrity of capital markets.
Id. at 10.
15
Huffman, supra note 1, at 251.
16
Large cap firms had to begin compliance that next fiscal year, 2004. Smaller
cap companies still within fiscal years were given until the first fiscal year ending on
or after April 15, 2005. Id.
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daunting as it was unwelcome.17 Complaints and calls for repeal
reached a fevered pitch in the fall of 2004 when most large cap
firms found themselves wading through the oppressive morass of
internal control restructuring required by section 404.18
In a continued effort to respond to firms’ needs, the SEC
recently reviewed the first year of section 404 compliance efforts
and fine-tuned the implementation of SOX legislation. As its
primary goal, the review gauged SOX’s effect upon U.S. domestic
public firms and the outside auditors attesting to the quality of their
internal controls and management reports.19 This review resulted in
the issuance of guidance statements from the SEC, offering tips and
concessions to management and auditors, facilitating cost
mitigation and promoting efficiency in section 404 compliance
efforts.20 Section III.D. below discusses the relevance of such
concessions and the impact of such guidance on a firm’s delisting
and compliance strategies.
As regulator of the largest and most vigorous capital market in
the world, the SEC has also taken steps to ease SOX compliance
burdens for non-U.S. firms. Although all companies, whether U.S.
or non-U.S., are subject to section 404 compliance by virtue of their
listings on U.S. stock exchanges, the SEC specifically granted nonU.S. companies one extra year to comply with section 404.21
More than 1,400 non-U.S. public companies access U.S.
securities markets in one form or another.22 In 2003, Europe alone
accounted for 305 of the non-U.S. firms required to file reports
with the SEC by virtue of trading equity or debt in U.S. markets.23
Thus, the SEC’s choice to exempt non-U.S. companies from the
first wave of section 404-implementation is no trivial concession.
Furthermore, as this paper will show, the SEC continues to move
towards easing international compliance burdens and preserving the
global appeal of U.S. capital markets.
17

Stone, supra note 5.
See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 1, at 257–58.
19
Richard Baumann & Sarah Cebik, SEC Shows Flexibility on Sarbanes-Oxley
Internal Controls Rules, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP EUPDATES, May 17, 2005,
http://www.dorsey.com/publications/legal_detail.aspx?FlashNavID=pubs_legal&pubi
d=191913303 [hereinafter SEC Flexibility].
20
Id.
21
Bob Sherwood, Long Arm of the US Regulator, FINANCIAL TIMES (London),
Mar. 10, 2005, at Business Life 14, available at http://www.internationaltraderelations
.com (follow “Long Arm of Sarbanes-Oxley: Regulatory Imperialism” hyperlink).
22
PRENTICE, supra note 7, at 6.
23
Beth Carney, Foreign Outfits Rue Sarbanes-Oxley, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Dec. 15,
2004, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/dec2004/nf20041215_
9306_db016.htm.
18
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B. Section 404 Costs
Section 404 audits cost more than traditional audits. The most
costly components are tied to increased internal controls testing and
generating an external auditors’ opinion on management's
assessment of internal controls. A significant cost consideration for
both of these functions is the fact that many firms must first create
these new assessment and compliance programs before
management can even begin to make a reasonable assessment of
internal controls.
Because external auditors must now file an independent opinion
regarding both financial statements and internal control reports,
audit fees are rising significantly. Prior to section 404, auditors
developed a basic understanding of a firm’s internal controls, just
enough to facilitate the planning and implementation of financial
statement audits. At the time, the auditors only concerned
themselves with assessing the risk of material misstatements
detected by internal controls. The Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB), established by SOX,24 stated that
evaluating financial statements based on an understanding of
internal controls is insufficient to express a valid opinion on the
integrity of controls themselves.25 Thus, auditors must delve much
deeper, management must accommodate extensive auditor
inquiries, and costs rise accordingly.
In addition to auditing costs, section 404 will also ensure that
businesses spend a great deal on the development of internal
control systems. Developing and assessing robust internal control
systems requires the following components, all of which tend to
boost compliance costs: external resources, staff hours,
management’s time and attention, and new technology
deployment.26 While it remains difficult to estimate exact out-of24

The PCAOB was established by SOX to:
[O]versee the audit of public companies that are subject to the
securities laws, and related matters, in order to protect the interests
of investors and further the public interest in the preparation of
informative, accurate, and independent audit reports for companies
the securities of which are sold to, and held by and for, public
investors.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2005), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/gwbush/sarbanesoxley072302.pdf.
25
Donald K. McConnell Jr. & George Y. Banks, Auditing/Internal Controls:
How Sarbanes-Oxley Will Change the Audit Process, J. ACCT., Sept. 2003, at 49, 51.
26
Huffman, supra note 1, at 255 (two Fortune 500 CEOs estimated that their
companies will need approximately 20,000 staff hours to comply with the internal
control requirements).
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pocket and opportunity costs for the latest round of section 404
measures, most firms have fairly good estimates of the logistical
requirements associated with planned compliance efforts. A 2003
survey by Price Waterhouse Coopers found that executives believe
most SOX compliance costs will arise from increased needs for
internal resources rather than external auditing costs. Such needs
include documentation, legal compliance, policy development, selfassessment, staff training, and the adoption of new tools and
technology.27
Dire predictions of compliance challenges expected by U.S.
firms provided more than ample ammunition for non-U.S. firms to
fight SOX compliance; however, the first year of U.S. firms’
performance in the section 404 compliance arena largely lays to
rest the dire scenarios predicted for U.S. firms. Approximately 282
U.S. firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the
NASDAQ informed the SEC in the spring of 2005 that they would
file their annual reports late.28 While that seems to be a large jump
from the fifty-nine late reports filed in the previous year,
acknowledging that a total of 6,200 firms are listed on both
exchanges provides perspective as the actual percentage of delays.
Thus, the actual percentage is far smaller than earlier predictions
that a third of the market would encounter problems with timely
filings.29
C. The Non-U.S. Firm Delisting Trend
Widely varying compliance cost estimates justifiably concern
non-U.S. firms. In late 2004, professional accounting publications
surveyed 113 U.K. firms with dual listings in both the U.K. and the
U.S., on NASDAQ or the NYSE, and reported that firms anticipate
section 404 compliance efforts alone to cost them a total of £120
million or $241 million.30 Financial Executives International

27
Ellen Engel, Rachel M. Hayes & Xue Wang, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
Firms’ Going-Private Decisions, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK, May 6, 2004,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=546626.
28
Corporate Counsel, Learning to Love SOX, CORP. COUNS. MAG, June 22, 2005,
available
at
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/pubarticleCC.jsp?id=1118666115111
(registration required) (Edward Knight, General Counsel for The NASDAQ Stock
Market Inc., arguing that SOX has accomplished its main goal of restoring investor
confidence in U.S. stock markets).
29
Id.
30
Paul Grant & Brian Moher, SEC Blocks Sarbox Escape from US, ACCT. AGE,
Dec. 2, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/news
/2036519/sec-blocks-sarbox-escape [hereinafter Sarbox Escape].

95

I NTERNATIONAL L AW & M ANAGEMENT R EVIEW

V OLUME 2

estimated compliance costs averaged around $3 million or £1.6
million per company, suggesting that the total figure could reach as
high as £177 million or $315 million.31 Disparities of £57 million or
$102 million between estimates fuels the trepidation and
speculation that makes dual-listed corporations take a long, hard
look at the relative value of their U.S. listings.
Despite the offer of one extra year to reduce the uncertainty
surrounding compliance costs, and an opportunity to rely upon the
experiences of U.S. firms and auditors to guide them, some nonU.S. firms are focusing less on getting the right systems and
controls in place than on performing cost-benefit analyses for their
U.S. listings. Citing the costs of SEC registration as
disproportionate to the perceived benefits, O2, a U.K. wireless
company, announced plans to delist from the NYSE and dissolve its
American Depository Receipts program.32 U.K. media giant ITV
also announced plans to delist in the U.S.33
After performing their own cost-benefit analyses, other nonU.S. firms did not take long to reach similar conclusions and take
action. The U.K. internet travel company—lastminute.com—
withdrew its NASDAQ listing in late 2004 and garnered significant
media attention on both sides of the Atlantic. The trend has spread
outside of the U.K. as well.34 Swedish tobacco firm Match, Nordic
telecom group TeliaSonera, and German e-commerce software
company Intershop Communications have all pulled out of U.S.
markets and auditors lay much of the blame for the European
delisting trend on section 404’s doorstep.35
D. Delisting Challenges
Notwithstanding the relative ease of delisting from the various
U.S. exchanges, the more important and far more complex
challenge of deregistering from the SEC will confound non-U.S.
firms’ efforts to avoid SOX compliance. Many non-U.S. firms have
shied away from pulling out of U.S. markets largely because of the
300-U.S.-shareholder rule, which exacerbates the logistical costs

31

Id.
Sherwood, supra note 21.
33
Id.
34
Paul Grant & Brian Moher, US Delisting Trickle Set to Become a Flood, ACCT.
AGE, Nov. 25, 2004, at 8, available at http://www.managementconsultancy.co.uk/acco
untancyage/analysis/2040840/delisting-trickle-set-become-flood [hereinafter Delisting
Trickle].
35
Id.
32
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and difficulty of deregistering from the SEC.36 To ensure U.S.
shareholders are protected, once a firm registers with the SEC it
cannot withdraw its registration if it has more than 300 U.S.
shareholders. Additionally, all SEC registered firms must comply
with SOX provisions, regardless of whether they are listed on a
U.S. market or not.37
A closer look at the specific requirements and practical
ramifications of the 300 U.S. shareholder rule reveals just how high
the SEC has set the deregistration barrier. In addition to the
financial, accounting, and public relations challenges associated
with withdrawing from U.S. markets, firms must also deal with the
logistical challenges related to tracking down all U.S. resident
shareholders. The firm must then find a tactful way to compel their
U.S. investors to sell their shares back to the company or put them
on the market and ensure that only non-U.S. investors purchase
them.38 Deregistration usually occurs ninety days after the firm
certifies to the SEC that fewer than 300 U.S. residents hold shares,
but the compliance issues do not stop there. Once the foreign firm
surmounts all those challenges, the number of U.S. shareholders
must remain below 300 for at least eighteen months after the
completion of SEC deregistration or the SEC will again impose its
reporting requirements upon the firm.39
When determining the number of U.S. shareholders, the SEC
includes underlying individual shareholder accounts rather than
brokers and banks.40 Thus, the costs associated with getting the
number of U.S. investors below 300 can prove quite large, not to
mention the costs of avoiding and settling legal disputes with
shareholders forced to divest their shares.41 Finally, even after
going through all the hassle of delisting and deregistering,
conducting certain kinds or levels of business in the U.S. can bring
companies back under the SEC's jurisdiction.42
36
Paul Grant, SEC Open to Delisting for UK Companies, ACCT. AGE, Dec. 9,
2004, at 2, available at http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/news/20365
72/sec-open-delisting-uk-companies [hereinafter SEC Open].
37
Robert C. Pozen, Discussion Paper, Can European Companies Escape U.S.
Listings?, 464 HARV. JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR L. ECON. & BUS. (2004), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/corporate_governance/papers/PoznEuropean-Companies-464.pdf.
38
Id.
39
Michelle Perry, Sarbox: Escape from New York, ACCT. AGE, Dec. 22, 2004, at 4,
available at http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/analysis/2040849/sarboxescape-york.
40
Sherwood, supra note 21.
41
Id.
42
Id.

97

I NTERNATIONAL L AW & M ANAGEMENT R EVIEW

V OLUME 2

The challenges presented by the 300-U.S.-shareholder rule have
not gone unnoticed by U.S. regulators and institutions. NYSE
officials have called for reforms, calling the rule arcane and
labeling it a significant delisting roadblock.43 The SEC has also
publicly acknowledged that non-U.S. firms struggling with SOX
compliance burdens should find it easier to delist from U.S.
markets, characterizing the rule as an important regulation that it
should reevaluate.44
The SEC also publicly acknowledged the desire of all firms to
come into and go out of markets as they wish but cited the
challenges of balancing such freedom with the U.S. government’s
mandate to protect investors and preserve the stability that makes
U.S. capital markets so valuable.45 The future will show what kind
of action will follow the SEC’s recent expressions of compromise
and empathy. Whatever happens, firms should be aware that the
SEC has reportedly taken the issue under “serious consideration.”
Significant changes, however, are unlikely to come fast enough for
firms looking to deregister.46
European business groups, aware of the crucial distinction
between delisting from a U.S. exchange and deregistering from the
SEC, launched a campaign to urge the SEC to make it easier for
companies to deregister.47 Although they have not indicated which
proposals are under serious consideration, SEC commissioners
reported leaning towards proposals that do not diminish protection
for U.S. investors. Of the various proposals under consideration,
the trading volume test has raised the most eyebrows48 as large
firms with high trading volumes could easily have thousands of

43

Sarbox Escape, supra note 30.
Alan Beller, Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance, was
quoted as saying that the 300 shareholder rule should be relaxed to a certain degree.
See SEC Open, supra note 36.
45
SEC Open, supra note 36.
46
Perry, supra note 39.
47
Europe’s business lobbying groups include the Association Française des
Entreprises Privées in France, Deutsches Aktieninstitut in Germany, and the
Confederation of British Industry (CBI). In March 2005, these organizations,
represented by the law firm of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, sent a letter to SEC
chairman William Donaldson, requesting that deregistration procedures be made
easier following a delisting. Jana Sanchez, Hotel California, IRONTHENET.COM, June
2005, http://www.ironthenet.com/feature.asp?current=1&articleID=4173. See also
Rank Could Look at US Delisting, INSIDE SARBANES OXLEY, Dec. 1, 2004,
http://www.insidesarbanesoxley.com/sarbanes_oxley_blog/2004/12/rank-could-lookat-us-delisting.asp.
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U.S. shareholders while maintaining a relatively low U.S. trading
volume by virtue of the sheer mass of shares traded globally.49
When the SEC wrote the original rule in 1934, 300 shareholders
fairly reflected a significant percentage of investors given the
relative size of the market at that time. Accordingly, it comes as no
surprise that another seriously considered proposal involves raising
the U.S. shareholder limit to 3000 to better reflect the size of
modern capital markets.50 Regardless of what form regulatory
changes take, expectations are high that the SEC will loosen the
rules to some degree. Thus, U.S. and non-U.S. firms alike should be
aware of both the delisting/deregistering distinction and the
probability of relaxed shareholder limits. It makes little sense to
bear the direct and indirect costs of satisfying comparatively simple
delisting requirements while ignoring the more costly and complex
requirements of deregistering, thus incurring all the delisting costs
and drawbacks without actually escaping SOX compliance costs or
noncompliance penalties.51
III. THE KNEE-JERK SOX DRAMA AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
FOR NON-U.S. FIRMS
The U.S. federal government has historically expanded its
regulation of financial markets when times of significant economic
turmoil have threatened the nation’s economic prosperity.52 SOX’s
sweeping reach became an indication of the pressure on both
financial markets and Congress in late 2001 and early 2002. Given
the intense pressures of the day, one might arguably characterize
SOX governance mandates, such as section 404, as window
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For example, Congress enacted the Future Trading Act of 1921 in the wake of
a severe recession after World War I when Europe’s presence in the world agricultural
markets increased. Farm prices collapsed and farm foreclosure rates skyrocketed with
the elimination of U.S. price controls. Similarly, after the stock market crashed in
1929, the Great Depression prompted far-reaching extensions of federal power over
capital markets. Conspicuous among these was the enactment of federal securities
laws in the 1930s as part of the New Deal. SOX is just one more instance of
reactionary legislation. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of
Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1591–92 (2005), available at
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/114-7/Romano.pdf (arguing that SOX provisions
were the result of political considerations amid a free-falling stock market and media
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dressing, the adoption of which only made sense insofar as it
calmed the media frenzy surrounding corporate scandals.53
In a more stable climate, Congress might have sought a
different balance between reform implementation costs and
improvement in audit quality or other investor benefits.54 However,
with the losses from the financial scandals of the day still stinging
and fresh, future compliance costs seemed a trite concern as
Congress quickly signed SOX into law.55 Three years later, with the
pain and uncertainties generated by the Enron and WorldCom
losses fading into history, the full extent of SOX compliance costs
weigh heavily upon firms obligated to comply. Though predictions
remain understandably dire, firms still cannot accurately predict
exact compliance costs, largely because the SEC’s implementation
of SOX mandates will determine the nature and extent of costs for
both U.S. and non-U.S. firms.56 When the actual costs play out,
however, U.S. legislators and regulators are likely to follow their
knee-jerk reaction with a softened stance.
Regardless of just how aggressively the SEC plans to
implement SOX standards, the handful of firms deciding to
withdraw from U.S. capital markets reflects the skepticism some
firms harbor regarding the value of their U.S. listings.57 Rather than
delist and raise capital in non-U.S. markets, some firms choose to
go private—especially some specific types of firms. Certain
characteristics, such as small firm size, low share-turnovers, and
large proportions of inside ownership, have factored heavily in the
bulk of withdrawal decisions.58
Unlike small, closely held firms, many large international firms
clearly recognize the value of maintaining unfettered access to U.S.
capital markets. In an effort to defray SOX compliance costs
without delisting, the European business community rallied its
executives and lobbyists to meet with SEC officials in late 2004 to
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advocate rule changes to ease the compliance burden for non-U.S.
firms.59 Shortly thereafter SEC officials reassured business
communities outside the U.S. that they were listening to foreign
concerns about increasing compliance burdens60 and subsequently
announced their consideration of the proposal to delay section 404
compliance deadlines for foreign registrants.61 The SEC eventually
made the proposal official, announcing that non-U.S. firms would
have one extra year, until July 15, 2006, to comply with SOX.62
While foreign firms view the delay as a welcome concession,
compliance concerns remain. Many of those involved in the system,
including SEC officials, express concern that section 404
compliance initiatives will amount to little more than “expensive,
short-term, check-the-box exercise[s], taking focus away from
management and moving it to internal and external auditors.”63 The
time and resource intensive requirements of section 404 have
played a key role in branding overseas SOX compliance as a
draconian U.S. response to the Enron scandals, especially in the
European business community. In 2005 the SEC announced its
intention to continue monitoring implementation of section 404 and
its impact upon smaller public companies and non-U.S. issuers,
signaling a willingness to deal far more flexibly with non-U.S.
firms than merely extending the section 404 compliance deadline.64
Recognizing the need for additional concessions65 to revitalize
global investment trends, the SEC also offered additional relief
beyond section 404. For example, European firms struggling with
massive International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
conversion projects can now anticipate overlaps of IFRS and U.S.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) requirements,
resulting in easier compliance with both.66
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A. Changing Compliance Attitudes
Criticism abounds despite the SEC’s initial efforts to
accommodate non-U.S. corporations looking to escape the long arm
of SOX. David Howell, former Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of
lastminute.com, which delisted from NASDAQ last year, blamed
regulatory costs and called the SEC’s reform efforts too little too
late.67 “Even without Section 404 the cost of listing was about
£500,000,” he said. “Section 404 moved it into a whole new
stratosphere.”68 With high average compliance costs in general,69
and uncertainty over exactly how much they specifically risk
paying, many firms claim to be on the verge of following
lastminute.com.70 Nevertheless, of all the firms threatening to
withdraw from U.S. exchanges, only the very smallest firms will
have the ability to make good on the threat without incurring
serious costs.71 SEC deregistration procedures will ensure that firms
will still face significant compliance costs if they insist on
withdrawing from U.S. markets.72
While few managers feel excitement about the past few years of
SOX regulation, mounting evidence indicates that the business
community has gone beyond merely coming to terms with SOX;
some see the potential for improving investor confidence.73 While
most firms claim a net loss to investors, a handful of finance
executives who actually perform the compliance work required by
SOX recognize benefits from compliance efforts. A June 2005
survey of 200 financial executives found that forty-four percent of
those polled thought the law resulted in a “net gain to investors,”
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http://www.accountancyage.com/2036781/donaldson-extend-404-aid.
68
Id.
69
Section 404 has been estimated to cost U.S. business more than $30 billion.
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Consulting estimates that SOX compliance will cost the seventy British-headquartered
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corporate board members conducted by executive search firm Korn/Ferry International
estimates that complying will cost the U.S. companies surveyed an average of $5.1
million. See Neville Hobson, Delisting in the US Because of Sarbanes-Oxley, NEVON,
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while forty-three percent called it a “net loss.”74 Any margin of
positive response, regardless of how small, reflects a far more
proactive perception of SOX legislation from what one would
otherwise reasonably expect. Firms that do decide to pay the SOX
compliance price admittedly have a lot of work ahead of them. U.K.
petroleum giant BP recently reported assembling a large
compliance team that will spend more than one year merely
evaluating what measures they need for SOX compliance.75
B. Voluntary Compliance
More than three years have passed since the first
implementation of SOX, and most U.S. firms have only recently
overcome the compliance challenges presented by section 404.
While many firms still find little appreciation for SOX, some
supportive voices back their words with action. Some private and
non-U.S. firms, not required to comply with SOX, voluntarily adopt
SOX-like practices for business-related reasons. Marvin F. Poer &
Co.,76 for example, found a business-related reason to document
business processes thoroughly. Although Poer has no plans to go
public, it does handle resources and assets for publicly listed firms.
Consequently, Poer decided to document internal controls to enable
issuance of a Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 70 report
to clients.77 An SAS 70 audit or service auditor’s examination is a
widely recognized indicator78 that a service organization has
conducted a thorough audit of internal control activities,
information technology, and related processes.79 Noting that clients
need a certain level of comfort and confidence to comply with
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section 404, Poer reports that requests for SAS 70 reports have
risen dramatically since section 404’s imposition.80
Non-U.S. firms also voluntarily adopt and comply with SOXtype provisions for the sake of protection, safety, and flexibility.
Hapag-Lloyd, Inc., a U.S. subsidiary of TUI AG, a publicly traded
German firm not listed in the U.S., decided in 2004 that some
compliance efforts made good business sense.81 Using the Internal
Control Integrated Framework of the Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations (COSO), Hapag began reviewing its existing
procedures and controls. They found many undocumented
processes and subsequently remedied them. TUI AG recognized
Hapag’s documentation efforts and subsequently mandated similar
activities on a global basis for the parent company and all other
subsidiaries.82
C. Transnational Regulatory Influences over Compliance Costs
When SEC chairman William Donaldson asked the SEC
Commission staff to consider delaying the effective date of section
404 compliance for non-U.S. companies, he stated, “It’s clear that
we need to take a look at some of the details that can be
improved.”83 Given the timing of his remarks, which followed a
period of intense lobbying from European business groups, his
announcement illustrates the SEC’s willingness to reexamine
SOX’s extraterritorial reach.84 More importantly, his remarks also
reflect the SEC’s compromising attitude regarding the non-U.S.
implementation of SOX regulations.85
In addition to giving non-U.S. companies more time to comply
with section 404, the SEC also compromised in several instances to
avoid conflicts with non-U.S. firms’ home-country requirements. In
response to one such accommodation, the SEC now specifically
accepts other independent statutory auditor structures where homecountry rules provide for them. Japan and Italy, for example,
require public firms to have an independent board of statutory
auditors who serve a function nearly identical to that of SOX-
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mandated audit committees.86 Once brought to their attention, the
SEC rightly recognized that two audit committees would be costly
and inefficient, not to mention a fertile source of potential conflicts
of powers and duties.87 German corporate governance rules also
mirror the intent of other SOX provisions. German law mandates
that a representative of non-management employees serve on audit
committees, and the SEC now considers such employee
representatives independent for SOX purposes.88
Non-U.S. firms also continue to do their share to find proactive
solutions and devise overlapping measures to bridge the gaps
between SOX mandates and the governance and reporting
provisions of their home countries. German pharmaceutical outfit
Altana recently found a solution to the facial conflict between the
SOX requirement that a board’s audit committee hire external
auditors and the German law’s grant of such authority to
shareholders. Recognizing the right to hire external auditors as
nonexclusive, Altana created an audit committee to oversee
appointment, compensation, and oversight of external auditors.89
Thus, shareholders retained the authority to appoint outside
auditors, as accorded by German law, while the SEC’s
accommodation of corporate governance laws in other countries
satisfied SOX requirements.
D. The Cost Implications of Reasonable Versus Absolute Assurance
Optimists predict that SOX adherence will lead to lower overall
costs due to the streamlining and automation of activities that will
result from comprehensive documentation of key processes and
internal controls.90 Proponents further argue that SOX merely
requires actions and policies that well-run companies should
already have in place. They further maintain that a strong system of
internal controls helps identify risks and inefficiencies that lead to
stronger business operations.91
Such long-term vision, however, does little to ease the current
sting of section 404 compliance costs. Enter the concept of
reasonable versus absolute assurance. Managers and external
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auditors should welcome the SEC’s recent exhortations to exercise
reasoned judgment by implementing a top-down, risk-driven
approach to their audit and compliance efforts rather than a onesize-fits-all, bottom-up, check-the-box approach. Indeed, a “checkthe-box” audit has far less likelihood of actually improving internal
controls than reasonable reliance upon professional judgment aimed
at securing a reasonable assurance of relevant risks.92 The SEC
reminded auditors, in particular, to acknowledge and tolerate a
“zone” of reasonable section 404 conduct, recognizing that
exhaustive audit activities aimed at securing absolute assurance of
all conduct typically goes far beyond what section 404 should
require.93
While officials remain understandably reluctant to specify
exactly how much costs should decline as a result of the changes
and guidance announced by the SEC and the PCAOB, many firms
will surely recognize significant savings as judgments improve over
time and audits become more effective, focused, and costefficient.94
1. PCAOB guidance
While new financial control audits give investors added
confidence in the accuracy and reliability of financial statements,
strict interpretation may have gone too far in some instances.
Acknowledging that the first round of internal control audits costs
too much, the PCAOB in May 2005 issued Auditing Standard No.
2, “An Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting
Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements”
(AS No. 2).95 AS No. 2 provides auditors with general and specific
technical guidance to facilitate the conduct of effective and costefficient audits of public firms’ internal controls over financial
reporting.96 When William J. McDonough, chairman of the
PCAOB, announced the issuance of the new Auditing Standard, he
highlighted the Boards’ commitment to seeing that AS No. 2 is
“implemented in a manner that captures the benefits of the process
without unnecessary and unsustainable costs.”97 Chairman
92
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McDonough justified the release of policy statements with costcutting interpretations of the rules by conceding “in some cases too
much work had been done to verify [financial] statements.”98
Recent PCAOB Policy Statements have refined and limited the
scope of the internal control audits by explaining how much testing
of internal control over financial reporting is actually required of
auditors.99 The PCAOB identified definitional issues and rigid audit
practices as the primary, unnecessary cost drivers affecting audit
processes, and thus in need of clarification. In particular, the
PCAOB has tried to prevent rigid application of AS No. 2 and
facilitate the exercise of auditors’ professional judgment in the
conduct of more cost-efficient audits.
The formal Policy Statement issued by the PCAOB specifically
outlined cost control tactics auditors can utilize under AS No. 2.
First, integrate preparations for the conduct of overlapping or
similar internal control and financial statement audits to ensure the
dual application and benefit of evidence gathered and tests
conducted for either audit. Second, exercise professional judgment
in assembling audit plans; thus, rather than utilizing standardized
“checklist” audits, auditors can specifically target the relevant risks
facing individual audit clients. Third, utilize risk assessments
required by AS No. 2 to help identify low and high-risk accounts
and then allocate the bulk of audit work towards high-risk areas
evincing a strong likelihood of material misstatement. Fourth, start
with company-wide controls and work from the top-down to
facilitate identification and testing of only those accounts and
processes that have actual relevance to internal control over
financial reporting. Fifth, communicate with audit clients regarding
accounting or internal control issues before100 making decisions or
implementing internal control processes under consideration.
Finally, take advantage of the significant flexibility that the
standard provides, giving auditors the chance to rely upon the work
of others for guidance and instruction.101
This last tactic is of particular importance for non-U.S. firms
faced with section 404 compliance efforts. In addition to the
98
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opportunity to learn from the mistakes and experiences of U.S.
firms required to comply with section 404 one year earlier, nonU.S. firms may avoid most of the costs and time delays attributable
to auditors’ first-time experience with section 404.102 Beyond the
first year, the PCAOB expects continued compliance costs to come
down as the initial costs associated with the first review of internal
controls dissipate. Moreover, as mentioned above, many non-U.S.
issuers can expect to find SOX compliance costs subsumed in the
costs of home-country compliance efforts.
2. SEC guidance
Expressing concern about unnecessarily high compliance costs,
the SEC commented on the questionable value of “mechanical and
even overly cautious” application of the section 404 rules and
standards.103 The SEC also announced that it expects a more
efficient integration of future internal control and financial
statement audits, effectively lowering section 404 compliance
costs.104 Furthermore, the SEC stressed appropriately tailoring
internal controls and section 404 compliance methods to the
operations of smaller companies, signaling the need for auditors
and management to exercise common sense and a measure of
previously unacknowledged autonomy to prevent audit costs from
spiraling out of control.
More specifically, Donald T. Nicolaisen, chief accountant for
the SEC, issued a staff report encouraging auditors to use their
judgment to reduce the checks they perform.105 The SEC also
strongly encouraged companies with financial weaknesses to
provide investors with additional information to help them assess
exactly how relevant such weaknesses really are to investing
decisions.106 Indeed, some weaknesses may have a pervasive impact
on internal control over financial reporting while other material
weaknesses or financial events have little or no impact at all.107 For
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example, the fact that a company needed to revise financial reports
does not necessarily prove the initial existence of material
weaknesses.108 Regarding the definition of “material weaknesses,”
the SEC also provided a more relaxed definition to determine
whether certain control weakness need to be reported at all.109
With regard to compliance facilitation for SEC registrants
abroad, the SEC adopted measures in April 2005 to provide leeway
for non-U.S. firms that adopt International Financial Reporting
Standards, granting one-time relief for eligible non-U.S. firms for
their first year of reporting under IFRS. Under the rule, eligible
non-U.S. issuers may file financial statements prepared according
to IFRS for the two most recent years, rather than the typically
required three.110 The SEC further extended eligibility to non-U.S.
issuers reporting under IFRS for the first time with respect to the
issuers’ 2007 financial year or earlier. The extension reaches far
beyond the originally proposed cutoff of January 1, 2007, but it
effectively accommodates issuers with fiscal years beginning after
January 1, 2007.111 The SEC created additional flexibility in the
final rule by permitting eligibility for firms that prepare financial
statements using IFRS as adopted by the European Union (EU
GAAP), provided the International Accounting Standards Board
reconciles the EU GAAP and the IFRS.112
As its staff continues to review section 404 implementation in
the U.S. and survey the corporate governance landscape abroad, the
SEC is likely to issue further guidance on section 404 and other
U.S. accounting requirements in the form of official guidance and
regulations. As firms and auditors move beyond the start-up costs
of section 404 compliance and as the SEC continues to provide
guidance, section 404 compliance costs for all firms will inevitably
decrease and likely even more so for non-U.S. firms.113
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IV. THE DOWNSIDE OF DELISTING
A. Listing Benefits and Opportunity Costs
With the biggest capital markets in the world, international
firms have long complied with U.S. regulations for the sake of
maintaining their listings on U.S. markets. 114 Despite the expected
increases in compliance costs, many non-U.S. companies are
unwilling to bear the opportunity cost of delisting and consequently
remain committed to maintaining their U.S. listings.115 Most large
companies have said they would consider delisting, but the
delisting trend has not gained enough momentum to push many
non-U.S. firms to delist, particularly larger firms involved in
generous
amounts
of
cross-border
commerce.
Global
pharmaceutical giant AstraZeneca International and U.K. Telecom
giant BT have cited their strong involvement with U.S. markets as a
significant incentive to keep their U.S. listings despite increased
SOX compliance costs.116
Investors are far more likely to invest in non-U.S. firms insofar
as they can rely upon the assurances and security provided by SEC
registration and its accompanying compliance requirements. Many
non-U.S. firms have found access to large numbers of investors
outside their home country by offering shares in the U.S. capital
markets. Foreign ownership of South Korea’s KT Corp.’s shares
has risen from zero to forty-three percent since the company listed
its shares on the NYSE in 1999; seventy percent of those new
shareholders come from the U.S.117
The benefits of U.S. listings go beyond mere access to millions
of affluent investors. Compliance with SEC regulations also
benefits firms in other aspects of corporate governance. KT Corp.,
for example, recently won awards from both the Korean Stock
Exchange and Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia as the top-rated and
most improved corporate governance practitioners in Asia.118 In
addition to improving visibility amongst investors, a U.S. listing
arguably adds the advantages of transparency and liquidity that can
ultimately translate into significant reductions in a firm’s cost of
capital as well as an increase in stock price.119
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B. Regulatory Considerations

1. The long arm of the SEC
The SEC seems more than willing to extend its jurisdiction
across U.S. borders in cases involving U.S. shareholder interests.
Recent SEC investigations of various foreign corporations120 have
demonstrated an arguably blatant disregard for and transgression of
geopolitical boundaries for the sake of protecting U.S. investors.121
In early 2005, Mexican broadcaster TV Azteca complained about
the SEC’s imposition of U.S. regulations on a Mexican company
and Mexican citizens.122 In the instance of the TV Azteca
investigation, the SEC used SOX provisions to justify filing several
civil fraud charges against TV Azteca’s executive officers. The
U.S. charged that chairman Ricardo Salinas Pliegas concealed $109
million in profits by purchasing debt at reduced prices from
Azteca’s cell phone subsidiary Unefon.123 Salinas denied the
charges and accused the SEC of exerting extraterritorial jurisdiction
in bad faith, but the SEC justified its charges with the fact that
Azteca trades its shares on the NYSE and thus must comply with
U.S. laws, including SOX.124
Although Mexico's National Banking and Securities
Commission led the investigation into TV Azteca’s dealings, the
SEC’s public involvement with the charges raised significant
international concerns regarding the new regulatory demands
emanating from the U.S. Indeed, SOX provisions could raise the
governance standard for any firm, regardless of national origin, so
long as the firm has sufficient cooperation with subsidiaries or
partners in the U.S.125
Despite the lack of appreciation many have for the “financial
imperialism” practiced by the SEC, most detractors readily admit to
the counterproductive nature of challenging or antagonizing the
SEC, which guards access to the best and most liquid markets in the
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world.126 The cost of tapping into U.S. capital markets will
inevitably catch some firms off guard, as some firms will probably
secure U.S. listings without a precise knowledge of the U.S. driven
obligations they are undertaking.127 Nevertheless, the SEC has
signaled its intention to preserve investor protections without
“inappropriately designing the U.S. capital market as one with no
exit."128
Regardless of changes in SEC policy, a mass exodus of nonU.S. firms from U.S. markets should be restrained by the
uncertainty present in the regulatory environment and the constant
demand for access to the world's largest pool of market capital.129
Non-U.S. firms, in particular, can benefit from adopting a proactive
wait-and-see approach regarding delisting strategies, especially in
light of the forthcoming reconsideration of the SEC’s 300-U.S.shareholders rule that may eventually exempt many firms from
compliance and result in further savings.130 Despite the relaxation
of deregistration requirements, a clear commercial benefit may
prompt additional withdrawal of firms who find the size and
complexity of U.S. markets uncompetitive and unproductive.131
2. The EU’s Eighth Directive
Most of the firms that have actually abandoned U.S. markets
had relatively small presences in the U.S. to begin with.132 Thus,
non-U.S. firms with relatively significant U.S. dealings should
consider the impact of changing corporate governance regulations
outside the United States. U.K. and European companies, for
example, are unlikely to pursue U.S. delisting strategies when
pending EU proposals may impose stricter financial regulation.133
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Indeed, the new wave of financial legislation emanating from the
EU will make delisting far less likely as Europe raises corporate
governance practices closer to the high standards set by U.S.
regulators.134
In the mid-1990s, long before the Enron and WorldCom
scandals in the U.S., the EU began looking at harmonization of
audit regulations for its member states. Shortly thereafter, the goals
for updating the “Eighth Directive”135 went far beyond the updating
and harmonization of audit laws across Europe. After the financial
scandals in the U.S. and the Parmalat136 scandal in Europe, the EU
proposed changes designed to utilize the Eighth Directive to
establish a new, heightened standard of corporate governance
across Europe.137 Although its narrow focus on audit regulations
calls into question the appropriateness of dubbing the Eighth
Directive a European version of SOX,138 the intentions and
expectations for both pieces of legislation are quite similar.
The U.S. rapidly adopted new laws focused on enforcing
executive responsibility to investors and protecting auditor
independence.139 The EU, on the other hand, claims to have little
need to rush into regulatory action since the European financial
reporting regime had already remedied the kinds of structural
problems found in the U.S.140
Nevertheless, after the financial scandals in the EU and the
U.S., proposals to broaden the scope of the Directive arose. Of
particular importance are the provisions designed to strengthen the
134
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role of the audit committee and bolster independent oversight of the
accounting profession.141
The EU amended one particular point of the Eighth Directive
regarding internal controls shortly after the U.S. scandals and the
subsequent passage of SOX. While the Eighth Directive proposal
does not plan to employ the same stringent internal controls
assessment and reporting requirements of SOX, it nevertheless
requires audit firms to report on key issues arising from audits,
such as weaknesses in internal control mechanisms for financial
reporting.142 While SOX is generally characterized as more rulesdriven than the EU proposal, the systems share similarities.143 The
EU adherence to the principle of minimum harmonization144
necessarily requires member states to exercise more latitude and
autonomy so that each may add their own specific national
requirements on top of the general principles outlined by the Eighth
Directive. Consequently, while the EU must still finalize and enact
the Eighth Directive, firms must still wait and see just how far each
respective European country will go towards enacting specific
SOX-type requirements. Many nations will undoubtedly follow suit
to one degree or another; the Italian Parliament, at least, will likely
adopt sweeping legislative reforms, reorganize securities and
financial regulators, and institute corporate governance changes
that closely resemble SOX mandates.145
Thus, in addition to the SEC’s willingness to work with nonU.S. firms and nations to facilitate cost saving compromises,
various nations around the world are likely to continue fortifying
their capital markets and developing consumer confidence with
stricter corporate governance regulations. With the U.S. leading the
way with SOX, many nations stand to benefit by looking to the
U.S. experience for guidance and by lobbying the SEC for
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additional compromises to increase the overlap between the U.S.
and international compliance efforts.
C. Pragmatic Considerations
This section highlights a few pragmatic business-related
considerations for firms considering compliance avoidance via
withdrawal from U.S. markets.
1. Mergers with U.S. traded firms
As the likelihood of future firm mergers and international share
trading increases, non-U.S. firms should exhibit increased interest
in preserving SOX compliance capabilities. When management for
potential acquirers investigates noncompliant acquirees, they will
most likely find them in need of reforms. Indeed, SOX compliance
capabilities may become a serious consideration when weighing a
firm’s suitability and profitability in a proposed merger. Thus, one
byproduct of SOX compliance measures may be an increased
attractiveness to potential acquirers.146 Similarly, firms acquiring
entities with U.S. traded shares will find themselves subject to SOX
regulation as a result of an otherwise profitable and strategic
merger.
2. Reliance by lenders and insurers
Many banks have started using measures similar to SOX
requirements to provide assurances of financial safety and
corporate integrity when issuing loans. Some private and public
firms currently use SOX provisions in representations and
warranties for loan documents.147 Insurance companies have also
begun to request SOX-type assurances and protections from firms
renewing their business insurance policies.148

146
Foley & Lardner LLP, SOX Impact on Private Companies, FOLEY &
LARDNER’S
2005
NAT’L
DIRECTORS
INST.,
June
7,
2005,
http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/2751/NDI_SOXPrivat
eCompanies_FINAL.pdf.
147
This is especially true for large loans given to highly leveraged companies. Id.
148
Id.

115

I NTERNATIONAL L AW & M ANAGEMENT R EVIEW

V OLUME 2

3. Executive recruitment
As SOX’s influence spreads, it has established a “culture of
personal responsibility” in its wake. 149 Not only do equity investors
have more confidence in what executives report, executives
themselves are more certain of their own results and far more
cautious of the liabilities imposed upon them.150 Firms refusing to
raise reporting and audit standards to SOX-type levels may risk
losing their ability to attract top, executive talent. Qualified
executive officers will have understandable concerns about the
firm’s ability to shield its officers from allegations of wrongdoing,
regardless of whether such corporate governance measures are
mandated or not.
4. Quality directors
Section 404 compliance measures have sparked a dramatic
increase in the number of companies looking for quality,
independent directors. Combining this fact with the tendency
qualified directors now have, as a result of SOX, to limit their
directorship positions results in a tight market for qualified,
independent, outside directors.151
Aware of the new standards, many qualified directors
understand the new liability they could incur because of their
directorships. Thus, good directors will serve warily, if they do at
all, on the boards of firms that shun the kinds of controls and
mechanisms required by SOX.152 As the culture of corporate
transparency spreads across the globe, firms will find themselves
unable to attract the kind of independent, quality directors that will
most benefit the company without significantly implementing SOXtype measures.153
5. Shareholder litigation
Future legal actions brought by unhappy shareholders or other
interest holders will likely rely upon the standards of corporate
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governance and internal control mechanisms set by SOX. Though
unlisted firms may technically escape SOX compliance mandates,
as a tactic, shareholder litigants will rely upon the highest corporate
governance standards available to evaluate reporting practices.
Litigants will likely characterize deviations from such standards as
breaches of duty inasmuch as they grow to represent an industry
standard.154
6. Investors
The financial scandals of the past few years have made
investors increasingly skeptical and nervous about the integrity of
financial statements. Additionally, savvy investors look closely at
firms’ future growth strategies. Venture capitalists and private
equity funds find firms with clearly defined track records or goals
for moving into and succeeding in global markets and expanding
overseas operations as particularly attractive. Thus, the closer
private and non-U.S. firms come to complying with SOX as a
means of facilitating future growth and cross-border expansion, the
more attractive the firms’ shares will appear to forward looking
investors.155
V. PROACTIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. Global Homogenization of Best Practices
The inevitability of regulatory and cultural conflict in
transnational operations is changing market expectations. Increased
focus on financial integrity and a growing culture of financial
transparency and accountability will affect all players in a global
market. As in all markets operating with imperfect information,
investors and corporate decision makers will rely on proxies to
measure a firm’s adherence to the new culture. SEC enforcement
efforts and the criminal sanctions associated with noncompliance
will promote SOX mandates as the gold standard or, at the very
least, as a reliable proxy against which to compare all other
corporate governance standards. Such influence is already
recognizable. Marco Ventoruzzo, legal counsel to the Italian stock
exchange, characterizes SOX rules as “not so different from those
in Italy.” Ventoruzzo further indicated that Italy enjoys the
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“advantage of being a second comer” in creating modern
governance rules.156
Additionally, increased competition and U.S. regulation of the
market place will certainly affect future regulatory and compliance
environments abroad. Heightened awareness of corporate misdeeds
and pragmatic concerns regarding the need for more financial
accountability and transparency will further homogenize solutions
implemented by corporate governance reforms across the globe.
Thus, it is reasonable to anticipate an emerging set of unofficial
best practices that industry leaders will come to expect, regardless
of localized compliance regulations. It is even more feasible to
anticipate that such practices will largely reflect the principles and
practices outlined by SOX. Thus, in addition to the regulatory and
pragmatic considerations outlined in the previous section, welladvised firms weighing SOX compliance costs against U.S. listing
values should take a long-range, holistic perspective on corporate
governance.
1. U.S. influences upon homogenization
The recent flurry of financial scandals in the U.S., Latin
America, Asia, and Europe has fueled an increasingly urgent push
for corporate governance reforms. At the same time, the scandals
may themselves be a response to the pressure corporations feel
because of the reforms. The questionable veracity of financial data
stimulates demand for more reliable and verifiable data while the
calls for heightened scrutiny have shed light upon otherwise shady
and “creative” corporate finance practices. Indeed, the Enron and
WorldCom scandals alerted the rest of the world to the dire need
for stricter controls over financial reporting, which led to the
discovery of similar scandals in other countries. Consequently, the
U.S. appropriately, through SOX, made the trailblazing effort to
restore the investing public’s confidence. Not only have SOX
efforts reestablished the image and safety of U.S. capital markets,
but other world economic leaders will follow suit to one extent or
another.
Asia, Latin America, and Europe all have sufficient incentive to
continue improving and aligning corporate governance reforms to
further facilitate further global trade and investment. Not only are
most of these areas influenced by U.S. dealings or subject to the
156
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SEC’s extraterritorial reach, increased transnational dealings
among non-U.S. firms will further homogenize corporate
governance practices. Air China’s efforts to offer shares on both the
Hong Kong and London stock exchanges evidence this trend. The
ability to use the same prospectus for both listings and the
undeniable benefit of doing business in similar regulatory
environments enhances the attractiveness of such dual listings.157 In
such cases, the fact that countries increasingly respect the standards
embodied in SOX make them the standard of choice.
Now that U.S. firms have safely passed section 404 compliance
hurdles, even though some did so only with significant concessions
from U.S. regulators, the willingness of non-U.S. firms to comply
should increase.158 Though costly and time consuming, compliance
benefits, including discoveries of legitimate and material
weaknesses in reporting controls, make SOX all the more attractive.
Executive officers for some non-U.S. firms fully expect SOX
compliance to pay dividends through renewed investor
confidence.159 In particular, the recent governance reform
experiences of two countries, Japan and Mexico, highlight the
spreading culture of transparency and accountability, which many
countries are rapidly assimilating in an effort to fuel economic
development and progress.
2. Japan
Yoshihiko Miyauchi, chairman and CEO of Japanese firm Orix
Corp., expects Orix to realize gains from “the recognition that we
have met the SEC’s and NYSE’s requirements for transparency and
governance.”160 Chairman Miyauchi’s comment illustrates the
cultural impact that SOX has outside of the U.S. Until recently,
long-entrenched customs and traditions enshrined Japanese
corporate governance with a virtual shroud of secrecy. Japanese
corporate reforms actually began in the late 1990s as a response to
increasing foreign investment and growing capital flows from nonJapanese sources. Investors demanded that public companies
become less opaque, but reforms came at a painfully slow pace.
Although foreigners currently own thirty-four percent of Japanese
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shares compared with twenty-three percent six years ago,161 calls
for increased transparency seemed to fall upon deaf ears until
recent financial scandals prompted Japan to jumpstart financial
reform efforts.
In early 2005, the government charged Yoshiaki Tsutsumi, the
infamous Shogun-style Japanese chairman of railroad, real estate,
and global hotel conglomerate Seibu Group, with extensive insider
trading and falsifying corporate records.162 Many view the Seibu
scandal as an important milestone in Japan’s previously sputtering
attempts163 to reform long-standing traditions of weak corporate
accountability and autocratic governance.164 Indeed, both Japanese
regulators and Japanese firms in the private sector took significant
steps to reform the tradition-bound culture in Japanese boardrooms
that fostered Tsutsumi-like governance for generations.165
Recent regulatory efforts to boost public confidence and
facilitate foreign investment have resulted in changes to Japanese
securities transaction laws. Effective since mid-2005, these new
laws effectively give financial regulators greater authority to
investigate corporate wrongdoing.166 The increased regulatory
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authority resulted in rapid action. In mid-2005 the Tokyo Stock
Exchange (TSE) delisted Seibu and three other companies,
including cosmetics giant Kanebo, for willfully misleading
investors.167 Although the TSE has not ejected a public company
for such actions in twenty-five years, the push for increased
accountability seems stronger than the inertia of Japan’s corporate
culture where saving face is often prized above all else. The TSE
now requires the chief executives of listed firms to sign SOX-like
statements, personally vouching for the accuracy of financial
reports.168
3. Mexico
As Mexico and other Latin American countries play an
increasingly significant role in the global economy, corporate
governance reforms will surely follow. Although the Mexican
investment climate is generally considered favorable, increased
global integration has led to increased scrutiny of its business and
regulatory practices. U.S. enforcement of SOX has pressured
regulators and corporations to do more to find and eliminate
fraud.169 In addition to section 404’s internal control requirements,
SOX provisions also aim at curtailing money laundering, requiring
U.S. firms to perform tougher “due diligence” investigations of
foreign partners.170 Mexico enacted significant financial reforms in
2005, thus strengthening its financial regulation infrastructure. The
Mexican Congress expects to pass new securities laws requiring
stricter controls over financial reporting,171 and the National
Banking and Securities Commission (Comisión Nacional Bancaria
y de Valores) launched financial investigations into seventy
Mexican firms.172 Unsurprisingly, the proposed Mexican Securities
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Market Law contains SOX-like elements and measures designed to
enhance transparency and promote better corporate governance.173
Protection of minority shareholders’ interests is of particular
concern for investors in Mexican markets. Many are awaiting the
exact wording of the regulation that determines exactly when
regulatory agencies must give notice to minority shareholders that a
firm is under scrutiny for noncompliance.174 As it stands, Mexican
minority shareholders often do not know until late in the game that
the shadow of regulatory investigation may have devalued their
stock. The TV Azteca scandal illustrates just how tough it is for
investors to get their hands on relevant information. The only news
Mexican investors received about insider trading and corporate
fraud allegations in the TV Azteca scandal came from the SEC.175
Although the probability that Mexico will enact significant
reform in coming years is debatable,176 the financial incentive to
clean up their markets is obvious. Anticipating absorption of firms
delisting from U.S. markets, authors of the proposed Mexican
Securities Market Law continue to try to overcome the notion that
noncompliant companies circumvent compliance mandates by
fleeing to the freewheeling Mexican markets. Authorities can only
accomplish this by creating a credible, legal compliance framework
that attracts capital and instills confidence in firms choosing to list
on the Mexican Stock Exchange.177 When the Securities Market
Law was first proposed in 2004, the Mexican Stock Exchange had
roughly 150 listings. By comparison, the South Korean Exchange,
with a similar-sized economy, has more than 1,500 listings.178
Foreign investment has substantially increased in Mexico in recent
years, and regulators seem willing to do whatever it takes to keep
the momentum going with legal reforms to reinforce the trend of
growing transparency in Mexico.179 The TV Azteca scandal may
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have pushed Mexico to jumpstart badly needed reforms.180 Aware
of the significant growth opportunities if they succeed, Mexican
regulators have plenty of incentive to continue on their chosen path
of reform.
4. Reevaluating the allure of delisting strategies
The financial institutions that facilitate the liquidity so valued
by public firms might have required—through competitive market
forces—more exacting internal controls, regardless of U.S.
compliance mandates.181 This raises the question of the true
necessity of SOX. Could the system have corrected itself without
the U.S. government forcing firms to bear arguably unnecessary
compliance costs?182 Although the question is largely irrelevant and
rhetorical for most U.S. firms at this point, non-U.S. firms must
consider the role that both U.S. regulation and market forces play
and will continue to play in driving governance standards higher.183
Considering the heightened transparency levels expected by
both regulators and investors, most firms, regardless of where in the
world their headquarters is located, must take a long, hard look at
where SOX compliance will eventually lead them. As the knee-jerk
reaction of strict regulation and enforcement gives way to the
flexible and cooperative concessions issued by the SEC and the
PCAOB, companies faced with compliance cost concerns should
recognize the equally shortsighted nature of delisting solutions.
Regulatory mandates and compliance costs aside, firms adopting a
proactive approach to corporate governance and investor relations
are poised to reap the benefits of confidence and flexibility that
only full and active participation in efficient and reliable capital
markets may garner.
B. Embracing the Benefits of Proactive Governance
Information is crucial to the health and vitality of both investors
and capital markets. Because of the critical roles that information
and information distribution occupy for investor-owned and
investor-oriented companies, it is not surprising that Mexican
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telephone giant, Telmex, increased visibility and transparency
through its SOX compliance efforts.184 Telmex executives further
characterized SOX mandates as a welcome opportunity for
improvement rather than an obstacle to be avoided.185
Although anecdotal, the Telmex experience illustrates how a
proactive approach leverages the time and money spent on
improving informational and decision-based strategies. Firms must
choose between merely tolerating and suffering through costly
compliance initiatives or taking full advantage of SOX to make
reporting procedures more efficient and gain more control over
operations.
Investor confidence concerns aside, proactive governances
advocates argue that good governance leads to improved business
information and consequently more confident and sound decisionmaking.186 Recognizing both the internal and external benefits they
may derive from strong governance practices, a handful of
progressive firms embrace a proactive approach to corporate
governance, some even going beyond SOX and NYSE listing
standards. NASDAQ’s General Counsel observed that some seek
out these enhanced standards specifically to satisfy institutional
investors’ focus on good governance.187 Other firms have reported
that enhanced reporting procedures and governance structures have
enabled compliance with both SOX and non-U.S. GAAP disclosure
practices.188 Strategically leveraging compliance initiatives into
reform opportunities has led others to extend SOX standards
beyond the executive level by requiring managers to evaluate and
certify the work of their own business units.189
For some, greater awareness of a firm’s inner workings is well
worth the hassle and cost of compliance. Among the many
perceived benefits is the expectation that improvements in
management’s internal control assessment will likely improve risk
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identification and allow companies to better respond to changing
market demands.190 Additionally, a proactive approach improves
controls and leads to increased operating efficiency, reduced
litigation, and stronger fraud controls.191
C. Proactive Investor Relations
SOX compliance, voluntary or not, builds an environment of
trust that may take more than a lifetime to create but can disappear
in seconds.192 The standards embodied in SOX guard that trust.
Strong corporate governance and investor relation programs should
aim to communicate to actual and potential shareholders that
management’s interests align with investors’ interests.193 This
joining of a public relations function with the higher-level
operations of compliance and equity fundraising may seem counterintuitive to some. However, such an expansive and proactive view
of governance initiatives readily recognizes SOX compliance and
other reform expenses as worthwhile outlays. Firms garner value
insofar as compliance efforts send “a clear message to the
markets,” showing how committed the company is to “protecting
minority rights and creating shareholder value by adopting the best
corporate governance practices set forth in every market where . . .
shares are traded.”194 The expensive and time-consuming nature of
SOX compliance, which makes delisting so understandably
attractive, justifies itself as a worthy investment when placed in the
context of long-term, holistic growth strategies. Aside from all the
logistical, personnel, and compliance costs associated with
lowering the number of U.S. shareholders below 300, and aside
from the technical and legal requirements of SEC deregistration,
firms must seriously evaluate the message that delisting and
deregistering may send to the investing public. Such a strategy may
very well communicate to investors that the firm will spend
millions just so they can avoid improving the same corporate
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compliance will do little to prevent future corporate scandals and the benefits derived
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more detailed criticism of the specific SOX provisions that will do little to remedy
corporate governance shortcomings and pitfalls, see Huffman, supra note 1, at 255–
57.
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governance standards upon which investors rely for confidence.195
Conversely, SOX compliance initiatives present firms with valuable
opportunities to reevaluate and strengthen investor relation
strategies.
VI. CONCLUSION
Well-governed non-U.S. firms, who at least value and plan for
stronger governance initiatives, should find the compliance efforts
well worth their time and money. Firms engaging in avoidance of
SOX-type reforms may find that cultural and market forces will
penalize them for lax governance reform initiatives. The SOX
implementation drama awakened the global community to the need
for increased accountability and established a growing culture keen
on exhibiting responsible and transparent corporate governance
practices. As the harsh reaction to worldwide corporate scandals
subsides, non-U.S. firms should refrain from joining in the antiSOX backlash by hastily pursuing delisting strategies, incurring
extremely high opportunity costs unavoidable by all but a small
handful of closely held firms. The hassle, complexity, and cost of
delisting and deregistering quickly erode the value of delisting
strategies, especially considering the opportunity cost of forgoing
access to U.S. capital markets, precluding opportunities for U.S.
partnerships, and preemptively limiting future U.S. operations.
Once U.S. and non-U.S. firms view the SOX drama as a kneejerk reaction meant to protect the primacy and reliability of U.S.
capital markets, and once investors and companies realize that the
reactionary zeal is subsiding, firms will begin leveraging corporate
governance reforms proactively, pragmatically, and strategically.
Many non-U.S. companies stand to benefit from SOX-governance
initiatives. Concessions from U.S. regulators in combination with
the compliance efforts of U.S. firms have eased the path for nonU.S. firms looking to leverage proactive governance strategies. If
firms do not embrace and eventually exhibit good governance
values, cross-cultural expectations, and competitive and regulatory
forces may eventually disadvantage such firms. Most non-U.S.
firms that have increased involvement with U.S. firms or markets
on their immediate horizon will ultimately find some measure of
SOX-like governance reform beneficial and inescapable.
Just as Hero and Claudio overcome the drama and complexity
of courtship to find bliss at the end of Much Ado About Nothing, the
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SOX drama will soon subside and well-intentioned firms who can
see past the drama will be able to preserve and develop valuable
relationships with U.S. capital markets and investors.
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